|
The Battle of Ceresole (or Cérisoles) was an encounter between a French army and the combined forces of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire during the Italian War of 1542–46. The lengthy engagement took place on 11 April 1544, outside the village of Ceresole d'Alba in the Piedmont region of Italy; the French, under François de Bourbon, Count of Enghien, defeated the Spanish-Imperial army of Alfonso d'Avalos d'Aquino, Marquis del Vasto. Despite having inflicted substantial casualties on the Imperial troops, the French subsequently failed to exploit their victory by taking Milan. Enghien and d'Avalos had arranged their armies along two parallel ridges; because of the topography of the battlefield, many of the individual actions of the battle were uncoordinated with one another. The battle opened with several hours of skirmishing between opposing bands of arquebusiers and an ineffectual artillery exchange, after which d'Avalos ordered a general advance. In the center, Imperial landsknechts clashed with French and Swiss infantry, with both sides suffering terrific casualties. In the southern part of the battlefield, Italian infantry in Imperial service were harried by French cavalry attacks and withdrew after learning that the Imperial troops of the center had been defeated. In the north, meanwhile, the French infantry line crumbled, and Enghien led a series of ineffectual and costly cavalry charges against Spanish and German infantry before the latter were forced to surrender by the arrival of the victorious Swiss and French infantry from the center. Ceresole was one of the few pitched battles during the latter half of the Italian Wars. Known among military historians chiefly for the "great slaughter" that occurred when columns of intermingled arquebusiers and pikemen met in the center, it also demonstrates the continuing role of traditional heavy cavalry on a battlefield largely dominated by the emerging pike and shot infantry. == Prelude == The opening of the war in northern Italy had been marked by the fall of Nice to a combined Franco-Ottoman army in August 1543; meanwhile, Spanish-Imperial forces had advanced from Lombardy towards Turin, which had been left in French hands at the end of the previous war in 1538.〔Arnold, ''Renaissance at War'', 180; Blockmans, ''Emperor Charles V'', 72–73; Oman, ''Art of War'', 213.〕 By the winter of 1543–44, a stalemate had developed in the Piedmont between the French, under the Sieur de Boutières, and the Imperial army, under d'Avalos.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 229.〕 The French position, centered on Turin, reached outward to a series of fortified towns: Pinerolo, Carmagnola, Savigliano, Susa, Moncalieri, Villanova, Chivasso, and a number of others; d'Avalos, meanwhile, controlled a group of fortresses on the periphery of the French territory: Mondovì, Asti, Casale Monferrato, Vercelli, and Ivrea.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 229. D'Avalos had captured Mondovì only a short time before.〕 The two armies occupied themselves primarily with attacking each other's outlying strongholds. Boutières seized San Germano Vercellese, near Vercelli, and laid siege to Ivrea; d'Avalos, meanwhile, captured Carignano, only fifteen miles south of Turin, and proceeded to garrison and fortify it.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 229. Oman, citing Du Bellay, describes the new fortifications as "five bastions, good curtains between them, and a deep ditch".〕 As the two armies returned to winter quarters, Francis I of France replaced Boutières with François de Vendôme, Count of Enghien, a prince with no experience commanding an army.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 229–30.〕 Francis also sent additional troops to the Piedmont, including several hundred heavy cavalry, some companies of French infantry from Dauphiné and Languedoc, and a force of quasi-Swiss from Gruyères.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 230. The Swiss, while trained as pikemen, had been raised by the Count of Gruyères from his own lands, rather than being traditional levies of the Swiss cantons; Oman cites Giovio's description of the men having been "raised from all regions of the Upper Rhone and the Lake of Geneva".〕 In January 1544, Enghien laid siege to Carignano, which was defended by Imperial troops under the command of Pirro Colonna.〔Knecht, ''Renaissance Warrior'', 490; Oman, ''Art of War'', 230. Oman notes that the garrison of Carignano included some of d'Avalos's best troops.〕 The French were of the opinion that d'Avalos would be forced to attempt a relief of the besieged city, at which point he could be forced into a battle; but as such pitched battles were viewed as very risky undertakings, Enghien sent Blaise de Lasseran-Massencôme, seigneur de Montluc, to Paris to ask Francis for permission to fight one.〔Knecht, ''Renaissance Warrior'', 490; Oman, ''Art of War'', 230. Oman notes that Du Bellay, seemingly having some dislike for Montluc, avoids identifying the messenger in his chronicle, describing him as ''"un gentilhomme"'' without giving his name.〕 Montluc apparently convinced Francis to give his assent—contingent on the agreement of Enghien's captains—over the objections of the Comte de St. Pol, who complained that a defeat would leave France exposed to an invasion by d'Avalos's troops at a time when Charles V and Henry VIII of England were expected to attack Picardy.〔Knecht, ''Renaissance Warrior'', 490; Oman, ''Art of War'', 230–231. The major source for Montluc's speech before Francis, and the ensuing debate, is Montluc's own autobiography; Oman writes that "his narrative cannot always be trusted, since he sees himself in the limelight at every crisis", but also notes that "it seems hardly credible that Montluc could have invented his whole graphic tale of the dispute at the council board, and his own impassioned plea for action". The requirement for Enghien's subordinates to agree to a battle is recorded by Du Bellay; Montluc does not mention it.〕 Montluc, returning to Italy, brought with him nearly a hundred volunteers from among the young noblemen of the court, including the young Gaspard de Coligny.〔Knecht, ''Renaissance Warrior'', 490; Oman, ''Art of War'', 231. A full list of names is given by Du Bellay and includes Dampierre, St. André, Vendôme, Rochefort, and Jarnac, among others.〕 D'Avalos, having waited for the arrival a large body of landsknechts dispatched by Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, set off from Asti towards Carignano.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 231. The landsknechts in question were veteran troops, and had been specially equipped with corselets.〕 His total force included 12,500–18,000 infantry, of which perhaps 4,000 were arquebusiers or musketeers; he was only able to gather about 800–1,000 cavalry, of which less than 200 were gendarmes.〔Hall, ''Weapons and Warfare'', 186; Oman, ''Art of War'', 231. Hall gives lower numbers than Oman, noting that they are estimates by Ferdinand Lot, and is the source for the specific proportion of arquebusiers in the Imperial army.〕 D'Avalos recognized the relative weakness of his cavalry, but considered it to be compensated by the experience of his infantry and the large number of arquebusiers in its ranks.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 231. Oman writes that d'Avalos related this view to Des Thermes, who had been captured by the Imperial troops, telling him that "after Pavia the Spanish officers had come to think little of the French gendarmerie, and believed that arquebusiers would always get the better of them, if properly covered".〕 Enghien, having learned of the Imperial advance, left a blocking force at Carignano and assembled the remainder of his army at Carmagnola, blocking d'Avalos's route to the besieged city.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 231–232, 234. The blocking force probably consisted of the companies of French infantry that had arrived as reinforcements during the winter.〕 The French cavalry, shadowing d'Avalos's movements, discovered that the Imperial forces were headed directly for the French position; on 10 April, d'Avalos occupied the village of Ceresole d'Alba, about five miles (8 km) southeast of the French.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 232. The other route available to d'Avalos was a sweep south through Sommariva and Racconigi that would have exposed his flank to Enghien.〕 Enghien's officers urged him to attack immediately, but he was determined to fight on ground of his own choosing; on the morning of 11 April 1544, the French marched from Carmagnola to a position some three miles (5 km) to the southeast and awaited d'Avalos's arrival.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 232.〕 Enghien and Montluc felt that the open ground would give the French cavalry a significant tactical advantage.〔Hall, ''Weapons and Warfare'', 186. Hall notes that Montluc, by his own account, told Enghien, "Sir sir, what more could you have desired of God Almighty () to find the enemy... in the open field, () neither hedge nor ditch to obstruct you?"〕 By this point, the French army consisted of around 11,000–13,000 infantry, 600 light cavalry, and 900–1,250 heavy cavalry; Enghien and d'Avalos each had about twenty pieces of artillery.〔Hall, ''Weapons and Warfare'', 186; Oman, ''Art of War'', 232–234. Oman notes that there are a variety of figures available for the strength of the French army; he gives "figures somewhat lower than Montluc's... and somewhat higher than Du Bellay's...". Hall gives the lower number for the infantry but the higher number for the heavy cavalry, in both cases from Lot, and notes that only around 500 of the heavy cavalry were actually gendarmes.〕 The battle came at a fortunate time for Enghien, as his Swiss troops were—as they had before the Battle of Bicocca—threatening to march home if they were not paid; the news of the impending battle restored some calm to their ranks.〔Oman, ''Art of War'', 232. Francis had sent some forty thousand écus, which was less than a month's worth of back pay.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Ceresole」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|